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Abstract 
Overgeneral memory, where individuals exhibit difficulties in retrieving specific 
episodes from autobiographical memory, has been consistently linked with emotional 
disorders.  However, the majority of this literature has relied upon a single 
methodology, in which participants respond to emotional cue words with explicit 
instructions to retrieve/simulate specific events.  Through use of sentence completion 
tasks the current studies explored whether overgenerality represents a habitual pattern 
of thinking that extends to how individuals naturally consider their personal past and 
future life story.  In both studies, when compared with controls, dysphoric individuals 
evidenced overgeneral thinking style with respect to their personal past.  However, 
overgeneral future thinking was only evident when the sentence stems included 
emotional words. These findings highlight the importance of investigating the 
overgenerality phenomenon using a variety of cueing techniques and results are 
discussed with reference to the previous literature exploring overgenerality and 
cognitive models of depression. 
Keywords: autobiography; overgeneral memory; future thinking; depression 
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Overgeneral past and future thinking in dysphoria: The role of emotional cues and 
cueing methodology 
Emotional difficulties, such as depression, are typically accompanied by 
biases in cognition.  Beck (1967, 1983, 1987, 2008), in his cognitive model of 
depression, argued for a triad of negativity focused on the self, the world and the 
future. One area in which these cognitive biases have been investigated is 
autobiographical thinking, which incorporates the individual’s concept of self and 
how they view both their personal history and potential future life story. The ability to 
mentally ‘time travel’ forms an important component of autobiographical thinking; 
through the process of recalling and manipulating episodic information held within 
autobiographical memory, individuals can mentally place themselves in both past, and 
potential future, experiences.  
One key bias evidenced by depressed individuals relates to the accessibility of 
information from within autobiographical memory. Termed overgeneral memory 
(OGM), this bias is characterised by difficulties retrieving memories for specific 
episodes (single events that occurred on one particular day in the past).  Instead, 
experiences are often recalled at a more general level, often referring to categories of 
repeated events. OGM has been consistently found in a number of emotional 
disturbances, including parasuicide, major depressive disorder and naturally occurring 
dysphoric mood (see Williams, et al., 2007 for a review).  
Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model of autobiographical memory 
suggest that memories are stored hierarchically and that retrieval often involves an 
effortful and generative search process whereby general memories precede recall of 
specific episodes.  However, instead of proceeding through the hierarchy, the search 
can be prematurely aborted.  Williams and colleagues’ CaR-FA-X model (Williams, 
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2006; Williams, et al., 2007) suggests three factors that serve, individually or in 
combination, as the critical mechanisms underlying overgeneral retrieval.  A 
truncated search may result from reduced executive capacity (X) or as an adaptive 
coping mechanism, termed functional avoidance (FA), whereby the negative affect 
associated with specific events is minimised by retrieval of more general memories.  
Finally, capture and rumination (CaR) refers to the proposition that retrieval processes 
can be ‘hijacked by semantic overlap between current concerns and the cues that are 
being used to search memory, triggering rumination’ (Williams, 2006, p. 561).   
OGM may, in the short term, serve an adaptive function with respect to 
minimising negative affect; however, it is believed, in the long-term, to be 
maladaptive.  For instance, evidence suggests that an overgeneral retrieval style 
hinders the generation of effective problem-solving strategies (e.g. Evans, Williams, 
O'Loughlin, & Howells, 1992; Goddard, Dritschel, & Burton, 1996, 1997; Williams, 
et al., 2006) and that both OGM and poor problem-solving act as vulnerability factors 
for the onset and maintenance of emotional difficulties (e.g. Anderson, Goddard, & 
Powell, 2010, 2011; Gibbs & Rude, 2004; Nezu & Ronan, 1988; Sumner, Griffith, & 
Mineka, 2010). Furthermore, OGM in depression does not seem to occur exclusively 
as a mechanism for avoiding unpleasant memories, with numerous studies finding 
overgenerality in response to both negative and positive cues (e.g. Park, Goodyear, & 
Teasdale, 2002; Williams & Broadbent, 1986; Williams & Dritschel, 1988).  
Overgenerality also seems to extend across mental time travel abilities more 
generally, with depressed individuals also having difficulty simulating specific 
episodes that could happen in the future (Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams, 1996). 
Thus, it is feasible that, if overgenerality is a habitual style or retrieval and simulation, 
it may limit the extent to which depressed individuals can make use of other mood 
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regulating strategies; for instance, evidence suggests that retrieving and simulating 
positive events can be useful in terms of repairing low mood and challenging negative 
perceptions that an individual may hold about themselves, their personal history and 
what the future may hold (e.g. Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007; Parrott & Sabini, 
1990; Pictet, Coughtrey, Mathews, & Holmes, 2011).  
 Despite the consistent findings linking emotional difficulties and overgeneral 
recall/simulation, a number of questions and issues still remain.  One concern is that 
the vast majority of our knowledge regarding overgeneral thinking in depression has 
been derived from a single methodological paradigm; this approach, using the 
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT) and its future oriented equivalent - the Future 
Event Task (FET), focuses on voluntary recall/simulation directed by emotional cues. 
Early work in this domain drew comparisons between events produced in response to 
positive vs. negative cues. Currently, however, these comparisons are made less 
frequently due to an array of mixed findings (Williams et al., 2007) and recent 
confirmatory factor analyses suggesting that the AMT represents a one-dimensional 
instrument (Griffith et al., 2009; Heron, Crane, Gunnell, Evans, & Williams, 2012). 
Research using AMT, and to a lesser extent the FET, has yielded a wealth of 
information regarding the relationship between overgenerality and emotional distress, 
however it is not without its limitations; indeed, Williams et al. (2007) called for a 
diversification in the methodologies used to investigate the overgenerality 
phenomenon.   
 One limitation of emotional cue-word tasks is that they do not necessarily 
provide a clear representation of the pattern of retrieval/simulation that an individual 
uses in everyday life. The occasions when individuals are required to recall/simulate 
with an explicitly positive/negative cue are limited; instead, events are selected, as 
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they come to mind, in response to a myriad of cue types that are situation dependent. 
The type of cue used to elicit memories and simulations may impact both ease of 
generation and the type of events produced. For instance, Watson, Berntsen, Kuyken 
and Watkins (2013) have shown that involuntary memories, which by definition are 
not cued by the researcher, do not evidence the same overgenerality in depression. 
Therefore, it is important to investigate whether alternative cueing methodologies 
yield the same findings, with respect to overgenerality of past and future thinking, as 
are elicited by the traditional emotional cue-word methodology.  
 A further limitation of the cueing technique is that it often lacks the sensitivity 
to detect overgenerality within non-clinical participants; whilst some studies 
examining OGM in dysphoria have found similar relationships to those evidenced in 
clinical depression, others have not (Raes, Hermans, Williams, & Eelen, 2007). It has 
been argued that such samples may be able to overcome habitual tendencies towards 
overgenerality because of the detailed instructions, and repeated prompting, regarding 
the need for specific events. As a result, a number of authors have designed more 
sensitive measures of memory specificity for use within non-clinical samples; these 
tasks remove explicit specificity instructions and/or require participants to employ 
cognitive flexibility to alternate between specific and categoric retrieval (Debeer, 
Hermans, & Raes, 2009; Dritschel, Beltsos, & McClintock, 2014; Raes et al., 2007). 
Taken together these studies suggest that OGM could have a similar relationship with 
non-clinical levels of depressive symptomatology, and associated variables such as 
rumination, as has been found in clinical samples. Furthermore, these studies suggest 
that OGM can be elicited with methods other than the traditional emotional cue-word 
methodology.  
 However, to date, research exploring the relationship between depression and 
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overgeneral thinking, using alternative forms of assessing overgenerality, has 
primarily focused on memory retrieval. Two previous studies, both using an 
emotional cue-word methodology, suggest that depressed individuals do evidence 
overgeneral future thinking (Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams et al., 1996). In 
contrast, recent work from our own lab, using different lifetime periods as 
retrieval/simulation cues, failed to evidence past or future overgenerality in dysphoria 
(Anderson & Evans, 2014). It is important to note that all three of these studies 
provided participants with explicit instructions to recall/simulate specific events. 
However, how an individual habitually considers the future is more likely to emerge 
when the assessment method is not presented in the form of a ‘test’ with explicit 
instructions guiding simulation towards specific events. Interestingly, research with 
high functioning autism suggests that deficits evidenced when using such explicit 
retrieval/simulation instructions do not emerge with tasks measuring spontaneous past 
and future specificity (Crane, Lind, & Bowler, 2013; Lind & Bowler, 2010; Lind, 
Williams, Bowler, & Peel, 2014). As yet, no studies have used methodologies without 
explicit retrieval/simulation instructions to explore spontaneous future thinking within 
depressed/dysphoric samples. This forms the key aim of the studies presented here.  
 Thus, the current studies investigate the suggestion that the overgenerality 
evidenced in depression represents a pervasive cognitive style that, extending beyond 
laboratory-based cueing tasks, affects how individuals spontaneously think about their 
personal past and future. One alternative measure of memory specificity, developed 
by Raes et al (2007), is the Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test 
(SCEPT). Participants are provided with 11 sentence stems, each probing for thoughts 
relating to the past.  The instructions tell participants to complete each sentence 
however they wish, provided that each sentence is on a different topic.  When 
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compared with a traditional cue word paradigm the SCEPT demonstrated a 
significantly higher proportion of overgeneral responses, suggesting that levels of 
habitual overgenerality may be higher within non-clinical samples than research using 
the cueing paradigm has previously suggested.  In order to examine the relationship 
between habitual patterns of thinking in the past and the future a further eleven 
sentence stems were developed to create the Sentence Completion for Events in the 
Future Test (SCEFT; Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009).  In both cases the proportion of 
completed sentence stems that refer to specific events represents the level of 
specificity of past/future thought.  These two measures are used in Experiment 1. 
 The notion that overgenerality is a habitual style of thinking in depression 
would lead us to hypothesize that dysphoric, compared with non-dysphoric controls, 
would be less specific when referring to both their personal past and future on the 
SCEPT and SCEFT tasks respectively.  However, previous work exploring the 
relative nature, and functions, of past and future thought might lead us to hypothesise 
a more complex picture. Future thinking is naturally more abstract than past thought; 
fewer specific events are generated and, when they are, they are rated as less detailed 
(e.g. Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012; Berntsen & 
Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004). These differences may arise 
because future episodic simulation is more effortful than memory retrieval (e.g. Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; D’Argembeau, Ortoleva, Jumentier, & Linden, 2010) and, 
as such, it is less cognitively demanding to consider the future in terms of overarching 
concepts, expectations and schemata (e.g. Addis & Schacter, 2008; Berntsen & Bohn, 
2010; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013; D. C. Rubin, 2014). Thus, one considers specific 
future events only when required, such as for the purposes of future planning.  
Spontaneous future thought that is not directed towards any particular purpose or 
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function, as is arguably the case when completing the SCEPT and SCEFT, may 
promote particularly low levels of specificity in all participants. Thus, under such 
circumstances, we could hypothesise that no differences would emerge between the 
dysphoric and non-dysphoric participants with respect to specificity of their future 
thought.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Design & Participants.  A mixed 2x2 design was employed. Temporal direction 
(past vs. future) was manipulated within-subjects, whilst mood group (dysphoric vs. 
control) between-subjects. All participants were undergraduate students who were 
recruited in exchange for course credits. In an unrelated study, conducted within our 
laboratory, we obtained measures of depressive symptoms and self-reported 
history/current treatment for mood related disorders (depression or anxiety); based 
upon these responses a selection of participants were invited to take part in the current 
investigation. Individuals who reported high levels of depressive symptomatology, 
irrespective of history/current treatment status, were selected as potential dysphoric 
participants.  Individuals who reported low levels of depressive symptoms and 
reported no history/treatment of depression/anxiety were invited to participate as non-
dysphoric controls.  
Participants’ depressive symptomatology was reassessed at the time of testing 
and, again, all individuals indicated whether they had a history, or were currently in 
receipt, of treatment for depression/anxiety. Participants who, at the time of testing, 
scored 16+ on the Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) and 
reported no current treatment for depression/anxiety were assigned to the dysphoric 
group. The resultant dysphoric group comprised 30 individuals (4 males), with a 
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mean age of 20.87 years (SD = 2.91). Participants who had a CES-D score <16 and no 
self-reported previous or current treatment for depression/anxiety were assigned to the 
non-dysphoric control group; this group comprised 31 participants (6 males), with a 
mean age of 20.29 (SD = 3.20). An independent samples t-test established a 
significant difference, t(46.70) = 12.41, p < .001, in CES-D scores between the 
dysphoric (M = 25.20, SD = 6.28) and control (M = 8.74, SD = 3.70).  
Materials.  
Centre for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D). The CES-D 
(Radloff, 1977) is a 20-item inventory assessing the presence of depressive symptoms 
over the past week. The CES-D was chosen because it was specifically designed to 
assess symptoms of depression in adult community samples; this is in contrast with 
other instruments, such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), that were designed to assess depression severity within 
clinical populations.  Each of the items represents a potential indicator of depressive 
symptomatology, with participants asked to indicate the frequency of experience 
within the past week on a 4-point Likert scale. For example, ‘I was bothered by things 
that usually don’t bother me’ (0 = rarely or none of the time, 3 = most or all of the 
time).  Scores range from 0 to 60, with higher scores indicating increasing severity of 
symptoms. Radloff (1977, 1991) suggested that a cut-off of 16+ is indicative of 
depression.  A number of alternative cut-off scores have been suggested and used by 
various researchers; however, a cut-off of 16+ remains the most consistently used. 
The inventory has demonstrated strong internal consistency across a wide variety of 
psychiatric and community samples (e.g. Chabrol, Montovany, Choucha, & DuConge, 
2002; Lewinsohn, Seeley, Roberts, & Allen, 1997).  
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT). The SCEPT (Raes, et 
DYSPHORIA, MEMORY & FUTURE THINKING 
	  
11	  
DYSPHORIA, MEMORY & FUTURE THINKING	  
11	  
al., 2007) is a sentence completion task probing for past experiences (e.g. ‘‘Last week 
I . . . ’’ and “When I think back to…”). Participants were presented with 11 sentence 
stems, with instructions to complete each sentence stem any way they wanted 
provided that each was on a different topic.  The first author, who remained blind to 
the participants’ mood group status, coded all sentence completions into one of four 
categories: specific (referring to a particular place at a particular time, not lasting 
more than 1 day), categoric (referring to a category of events containing a number of 
specific episodes), extended (referring to one specific event lasting longer than 1 day), 
or a semantic associate (personal overgeneral semantic information). If a participant 
did not complete a sentence stem, an omission was recorded. A second rater coded 
responses from a randomly selected sample of 15 participants; inter-rater reliability 
was acceptable (Cohen’s Kappa = .88). 
Sentence Completion for Events in the Future Test (SCEFT). The SCEFT 
(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009) comprises 11 sentence stems that probe for possible 
future experiences (e.g. “Next week…” and “When I look forward to…”).  
Instructions were identical to those provided for the SCEPT and responses were 
coded into the same categories.  A second rater coded responses from a randomly 
selected sample of 15 participants; inter-rater reliability was acceptable (Cohen’s 
Kappa = .89). 
 Procedure. Participants were tested in small groups of 4-6.  Participants were 
provided with standardized instructions prior to each sentence completion task and, in 
each case, given a maximum of six minutes to complete as many stems as possible.  
The presentation of the SCEPT and SCEFT were counterbalanced across all 
participants, and followed by the CES-D. 
Results  
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 An initial 2x2 mixed ANOVA examined whether the number of omissions 
(where the sentence stem was left incomplete) differed as a function of mood group 
(control vs. dysphoric) and temporal direction (past vs. future). The mean number of 
omissions was 0.97 (SD = 1.49) and 0.70 (SD = 1.37) on the SCEPT, and 1.29 (SD = 
1.71) and 0.77 (SD = 1.33) on the SCEFT, for the control and dysphoric groups 
respectively. No significant main or interaction effects emerged (Fs ≤ .1.36, ps ≥. 25, 
ηp2s ≤ .02).  This suggests that any subsequent differences between the two mood 
groups or tasks were not a function of motivational deficits.   
 The number of specific events, categoric events, extended events, and 
semantic associates were calculated as a proportion of the number of responses on 
each task (i.e. excluding omissions).  The mean proportions for each response 
category across temporal direction and mood group are presented in Table 1.  
  A 2 (Mood Group) x 2 (Temporal Direction) mixed ANOVA examined the 
proportion of specific events generated. Significant main effect of temporal direction, 
F(1,59) = 45.09,  p<.001, ηp2 = .43, and mood group, F(1,59) = 4.10, p = .047, ηp2 
= .07, emerged; fewer specific events were generated in the future, compared with the 
past, task and by the dysphoric, compared with the control, participants. However, 
these significant main effects were further qualified by a significant interaction, 
F(1,59) = 4.99, p = .03, ηp2 = .08.  Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed 
that whilst the dysphoric, compared with control, participants reported significantly 
fewer specific events in the past task (p = .02), no differences emerged between the 
two mood groups with respect to the future task (p = .97). 
 To establish whether differences in the proportion of specific events were the 
result of any one particular type of overgeneral thought, three further 2x2 mixed 
ANOVAs examined the proportion of categoric events, extended events and semantic 
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associates in turn.  With respect to the proportion of categoric events, no significant 
main effects or interactions emerged (Fs ≤ .1.92, ps ≥. 17, ηp2s ≤ .03). The analysis of 
semantic associates revealed a significant main effect of temporal direction, F(1,59) = 
25.30, p<.001, ηp2 = .30; a higher proportion of semantic associates were provided in 
response to future, compared with past, sentence stems.  Neither the main effect of 
mood group, nor the interaction effect, was significant (Fs ≤ .0.84, ps ≥. 22, ηp2s 
≤ .03). Finally, with respect to the proportion of extended events, a significant main 
effect was evidenced for temporal direction, F(1,59) = 7.14, p = .01, ηp2 = .11, but not 
mood group. F(1,59) = .03. p = .86, ηp2 = .001.  This was further qualified by a 
significant interaction effect, F(1,59) = 4.19, p = .045, ηp2=.07. Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons revealed that dysphoric, compared with the control, participants 
provided more extended events; however, this difference was evident in response to 
past-oriented (p = .07), but not future-oriented (p = .25), sentence stems.  
Discussion 
Experiment 1 assessed the specificity of spontaneous past and future thought in 
dysphoria; it made use of previously published sentence stem completion tasks 
(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; Raes et al., 2007) that were developed as alternatives 
to the commonly utilised cue word methodology. In line with previous literature using 
the SCEPT (Raes et al., 2007), dysphoric participants produced fewer specific 
responses than controls when considering their personal past.  However, contrary to 
the prediction that overgenerality is a habitual style of thinking in depression, the 
same effect was not found in the future task; no significant difference emerged 
between the two mood groups with respect to specificity of future thought.   
 The current finding suggests that dysphoric individuals do not evidence 
overgenerality with respect to spontaneous future thought.  This is contrary to the 
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previous literature using a word cueing paradigm (Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams 
et al., 1996). As discussed within the introduction, evidence for overgenerality in 
depression has relied heavily on a single paradigm, whereby participants are 
instructed to recall/simulate specific events in response to emotional cue words.  The 
current findings further highlight the need to move beyond this paradigm to assess the 
presence, and nature, of overgenerality in depression.  
 The discrepancy between our findings and the previous literature suggests that 
dysphoric individuals are not overgeneral when they spontaneously consider, rather 
than being explicitly cued to think about, their future. However, the extent to which 
we can draw conclusions about the relevance of this finding is limited because it is 
unclear which of the variations between the methodologies is responsible for the 
observed effect. It is possible that overgenerality is not evident in spontaneous future 
thought because participants are no longer receiving explicit instructions to be 
specific.  Alternatively, it is feasible that the removal of emotional cues, as used in 
both previous studies evidencing overgenerality in future thought, is responsible.  
Experiment 2 was designed to differentiate between these two possibilities by 
incorporating positive and negative words within the sentence stems that probe for 
past and future thoughts. If Experiment 2 finds no evidence of overgenerality in future 
thought it would suggest that the removal of specificity instructions underlies the 
discrepancies; conversely, if an overgenerality bias emerges it would suggest that the 
removal of emotional cues is responsible.   
Experiment 2 
Method 
Design & Participants. A 2x2x2 mixed design was employed, with temporal 
direction (past vs. future) and sentence stem valence (positive vs. negative) 
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manipulated within-subjects. Mood group (dysphoric vs. control) was manipulated 
between-subjects. Similar to Experiment 1, all participants were undergraduate 
students whose initial invitation to participate was based on depression inventory 
scores in unrelated studies. Identical inclusion criteria to Experiment 1 were 
employed for determining the two mood groups. 27 individuals (8 males), with a 
mean age of 20.70 years (SD = 1.87) met criteria for dysphoria. 26 participants (13 
males), with a mean age of 20.12 (SD = 1.37) comprised the non-dysphoric control 
group. An independent samples t-test established a significant difference, t(36.64) = 
12.10, p < .001, in CES-D scores between the dysphoric (M = 26.56, SD = 7.12) and 
non-dysphoric control (M = 8.27, SD = 3.24) groups. 
Materials & Procedure. The procedure remained identical to that employed 
in Experiment 1, except that the SCEPT and SCEFT were adapted to include 
positively and negatively valenced words within the sentence stems.  This created two 
new sentence completion tasks assessing past (E-SCEPT) and future emotional 
thoughts (E-SCEFT), each of which comprised twenty sentence stems.   
To create these new sentence completion tasks twenty emotional adjectives 
were divided into four word lists; positive A, positive B, negative A and negative B 
(each list comprised five words). Using norms provided by Bradley and Lang (1999) 
the four lists did not differ with respect to emotional arousal (Fs<1) or word 
frequency (Fs<1).  Furthermore, the two positive lists did not differ from each other 
with respect to emotional valence, nor did the two negative lists (Fs<1).  The 
emotional adjectives were embedded into sentence stems that probed past and future 
thought (e.g. ‘In the past/future my biggest achievement….’ and ‘Looking 
back/forward the loneliest…’). The four word lists were fully counterbalanced across 
the past and future tasks. The sentence stems were carefully created to ensure that 
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each could be completed by referring to a specific event but could also, equally, be 
completed by referring to other types of events (i.e. categoric and extended) or more 
personal semantic information.  
The first author, who remained blind to the participants’ mood group status, 
coded all sentence completions into the same four categories as used in Experiment 1.  
A second rater coded responses from a randomly selected sample of 16 participants; 
inter-rater reliability was acceptable for both the E-SCEPT (Cohen’s Kappa =.81) and 
E-SCEFT (Cohen’s Kappa =.85). 
Results 
An initial 2x2x2 mixed ANOVA examined whether the number of omissions differed 
as a function of mood group (control vs. dysphoric), sentence stem valence (positive 
vs. negative) and temporal direction (past vs. future). Mean numbers of omissions 
were low across both control (Positive E-SCEPT, M=.07, SD=.27; Negative E-
SCEPT M = .08, SD=.39; Positive E-SCEFT, M = .19, SD=.49; Positive E-SCEFT, 
M=.31, SD=.62) and dysphoric (Positive E-SCEPT, M=.18, SD=.40; Negative E-
SCEPT M = .14, SD=.36; Positive E-SCEFT, M = .22, SD=.42; Positive E-SCEFT, 
M=.15, SD=.46) participants. A trend towards significance emerged for the Mood 
Group x Valence interaction, F(1,51) = 3.06, p =. 09, ηp2 =.06. Dysphoric participants 
failed to complete more positive, compared with negative, sentence stems, whilst 
control participants evidenced the reverse pattern.  However, no significant difference 
emerged in any bonferroni adjusted pairwise comparisons (all ps ≥. 22). All other 
main effects and interactions effects were not significant (Fs ≤ .2.43, ps ≥. 13, ηp2s 
≤ .05).  The lack of any clear significant findings in the number of omissions suggests 
that any subsequent differences between the two mood groups or tasks were not a 
function of motivational deficits. 
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 The mean proportions for each response category were calculated as in 
Experiment 1; they are presented as a function of mood group, sentence stem valence 
and temporal direction in Table 2.  
  A 2 (mood group) x 2 (sentence valence) x 2 (temporal direction) mixed 
ANOVA examined the proportion of specific events generated.  A significant main 
effect of mood group emerged, F(1,51) = 10.38, p = .002, ηp2 = .17; dysphoric, 
compared with control, participants reported fewer specific events.  A significant 
main effect of temporal direction also emerged, F(1,51)=29.27, p < .001, ηp2=.37; 
fewer specific events were generated in the future, compared with the past, task.  In 
contrast to Experiment 1, the Mood Group x Temporal Direction was not significant, 
F(1,51) = 0.33, p = .57, ηp2=.01. Dysphoric, compared with control, participants were 
less specific in their responses in both past and future tasks. All other main and 
interaction effects were not significant (Fs ≤ .2.17, ps ≥. 15, ηp2s ≤ .04). 
  To explore whether the lower level of specific responses evidenced in the 
dysphoric group was the result of any one particular type of overgeneral response, 
three further 2x2x2 ANOVAS were conducted. Across all three ANOVAs the main 
effect of mood group was not significant (Fs ≤ .2.02, ps ≥. 16, ηp2s ≤ .04).  
Furthermore, all mood group x temporal direction, mood group x valence and the 
three-way interaction effects were all not significant (Fs ≤ .2.05, ps ≥. 16, ηp2s ≤ .04). 
The only significant effects to emerge related to temporal direction and sentence stem 
valence. With respect to categoric events, the main effect of valence was significant, 
F(1,51) = 5.36, p = .03, ηp2 = .10, whilst the main effect of temporal direction 
approached significant, F(1,51)=3.23, p = .08, ηp2 = .06; these main effects were 
qualified by a significant valence x temporal direction interaction, F(1,51) = 6.85, p 
= .01, ηp2=.12. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that a higher 
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proportion of categoric responses were provided in response to negative, compared 
with positive, sentence stems; however, this effect was only evidence within the 
future (p = .76), but not the past (p = .001), task. With respect to extended events, 
main effects of temporal direction, F(1.51)= 15.51, p <.001, ηp2= .23, and valence, 
F(1,51) = 5.67, p = .02, ηp2=.10, were evident. Extended events were provided more 
frequently in completion of future, compared with past, sentence stems. Furthermore, 
they were provided more frequently in response to positive, compared with negative, 
sentence stems.   
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 investigated the specificity of past and future thought using a 
modified sentence stem completion procedure, whereby emotional words formed part 
of each sentence stem. In contrast to Experiment 1, we found that dysphoric, 
compared with control, participants exhibited reduced specificity for both 
spontaneously generated past and future thought. In Experiment 1 reduced specificity 
only emerged when dysphoric individuals considered their personal past. Thus, these 
findings lend support to our argument that the nature of the cues, rather than the 
absence of instructions to be specific, underlies the findings of Experiment 1. 
Specifically, when sentence stems include emotional words, dysphoria is associated 
with reduced specificity in both past and future thought.   
General Discussion 
 Previous work, using a word cueing paradigm, has evidenced reduced 
specificity of future thought in depression and dysphoria (Dickson & Bates, 2006; 
Williams et al., 1996).  The current findings, using sentence stem completion tasks, 
found overgenerality of future thought in dysphoria; however, the bias was only 
evident when sentence stems included emotional words. To date, therefore, the 
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majority of work that has evidenced overgenerality of future thought in depression 
has involved emotional cues, either as explicit or implicit cues for simulation.  
Conversely, research examining memory biases suggests that the relationship between 
overgenerality and depression is more pervasive; research using a variety of 
assessment methods, including the findings reported here, have evidenced 
overgenerality (e.g. Dritschel et al., 2014; Raes et al., 2007).   
 Our findings, therefore, suggest that biases found within memory processes are 
not always mirrored within future-oriented thought. Support for this notion can be 
drawn from Dalgleish, Hill, Golden, Morant and Dunn’s (2011) investigation of past 
and future life stories in depression.  Participants were asked to generate, and attribute 
positive/negative adjectives to, themes/chapters within their personal life story.  
Depressed individuals attributed more negative, and fewer positive, attributes to past, 
but not future, life chapters. Thus, the depressogenic structuring that is evident when 
thinking about their personal past was not evident when they considered their future 
life story.  Therefore, taken together, it appears that the depressive biases in future 
thought are more subtle than those evidenced in memory recall.  In order to fully 
elucidate on these subtle deficits we, therefore, need to ensure that methodologies are 
suitably sensitive; measures such as the E-SCEFT, rather than the original SCEFT, 
appear to be more sensitive to future-oriented biases in dysphoria/depression.  
 With regards to the current investigation, we must consider why differences 
emerged between past and future overgenerality and, in particular, why dysphoric 
participants only evidence overgenerality of future thought under certain parameters. 
As discussed in the introduction, it has been proposed that past and future thought 
serve different functions (e.g. Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013); 
furthermore, whilst they both make use of the same autobiographical knowledge base, 
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they may do so in subtly different ways (e.g. Addis et al., 2007; Anderson et al., 2012; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2010). We propose that it is these differences between past and 
future thinking that lead to the findings presented here.  
 As discussed within the introduction, Williams’ (2006) CarFAX model suggests 
that OGM arises due to one, or a combination, of three processes; cognitive avoidance, 
reduced executive resources and rumination.  Thus, whilst OGM might arise as a 
function of avoiding negative affect, it is maintained by ruminative processes and/or 
limited executive resources; as a result it becomes a habitual cognitive style and 
deficits in specificity tend to pervade across all aspects of past thought. Our findings 
are in line with this model.  
 However, as discussed within the introduction, previous research has shown that 
future thinking is, naturally, less specific than past thought (e.g. Anderson & 
Dewhurst, 2009; Anderson et al., 2012; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & van 
der Linden, 2004).  This reduced specificity, arguably, serves a functional purpose. 
Considering specific events, both in the past and future, is considered useful because 
it allows one to analyse past mistakes and plan future actions (e.g. Szpunar, 2010); 
however, research has shown that it is more complex and effortful to think about 
specific future, compared with past, events (e.g. Addis et al., 2007; D’Argembeau et 
al., 2010).  The array of possible future events is limitless, yet the number of past 
events is finite; if an individual consistently thought about their future at the level of 
specific events then they would, arguably, overload limited cognitive resources. 
Moreover, consistently considering our personal future at the level of specific events 
is, potentially, unnecessary; previous research suggests that we tend to consider the 
future in terms of overarching concepts, timelines and categories of events (e.g. 
Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; D. C. Rubin, 2014). Thus, it is likely that we, only when 
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required for the purposes of future planning, extend these general thoughts to specific 
event simulations. Thus, our natural tendency with respect to future thought is not to 
be specific unless the situation requires us to be. Thus, in a task that assesses 
spontaneous future thought the tendency, across all participants, is to lean towards 
general, rather than specific, responses. This is evidenced in Experiment 1 where only 
17% of responses were specific in the future task; this figure was identical across both 
mood groups and is in line with data reported in previous work using the SCEFT 
(Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009).   
 We argue that depressed and dysphoric participants experience difficulties when 
circumstances require them to move away from thinking about their future in terms of 
overarching concepts, timelines and categories of events. Reduced executive 
resources and/or ruminative processes make it more difficult for them, compared to 
their non-depressed counterparts, to overcome the general tendency towards non-
specificity of future thought. Cueing methodologies explicitly express this need for 
specificity, hence why previous studies using this methodology evidenced depressive 
overgenerality in future thought (e.g. Dickson & Bates, 2006; Williams et al., 1996). 
However, other aspects of a task could cue the need for specificity implicitly; with 
respect to the E-SCEFT, we suggest that the emotional words form this implicit cue.  
In Experiment 2 the dysphoric participants produced a similar proportion of specific 
responses to those evidenced in Experiment 1 (16% and 18% for positive and 
negative sentence stems respectively), yet the proportion of specific response 
provided by control participants’ almost doubled (30% and 35% for positive and 
negative sentence stems respectively).  Therefore, it was not the case that dysphoric 
participants produce fewer specific responses in the emotional tasks per se, but rather 
that the presence of emotional cues within the sentence stems seems to encourage 
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non-dysphoric participants to be more specific about their personal future.   
 Recent research has suggested that goals form an overarching structure that 
organises and guides our future thoughts (D’Argembeau & Demblon, 2012; 
D’Argembeau & Mathy, 2011; Demblon & D’Argembeau, 2014).  Furthermore, 
emotions and goals are intrinsically linked. Theories of emotion posit that positive 
emotions are linked to approach goals and represent desired states signifying 
achievement of, or progress towards, a goal. Conversely, negative emotions are linked 
to avoidance goals and represent undesired states that motivate action (Elliot, Eder, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2013). Thus, we posit that the emotional words within the E-SCEFT 
activate goal hierarchies and, as a result, individuals are motivated to think about 
specific events that would represent achievement of these goals. However, for the 
reasons previously discussed, this task is more difficult for depressed participants and, 
as a result, they evidence overgenerality on this task. These ideas are supported by 
recent work suggesting that depressed individual are able to generate similar numbers 
of goals as their non-depressed counterparts, yet the goals they produce are less 
specific and perceived to be less obtainable (Dickson & Moberly, 2013; Dickson, 
Moberly, & Kinderman, 2011).  Future research could explore a number of tenets of 
this goal-based explanation.  For instance, it would predict that explicitly goal-related 
sentence stems would lead to a similar pattern of overgenerality as emotional word 
stems.  Furthermore, emotional words would activate higher levels of goal-related 
thinking in non-depressed, compared with depressed/dysphoric, individuals.  
It is of interest to note that when overgenerality was evidenced it did not occur 
as a function of an increased reporting of categoric events, as is generally evidenced 
in event cueing tasks.  In Experiment 1 the overgenerality was due to the dysphoric 
participants reporting more extended events in relation to the past.  In Experiment 2, 
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no one type of general event emerged as more prominent within the responses 
provided by dysphoric participants.  This anomaly may reflect the difference in 
instructions between the present studies and the cueing tasks used in previous studies, 
whereby the current studies did not ask participants to actively search for a specific 
event.  In the cueing task participants make their best effort to search through the 
hierarchy to retrieve/simulate specific episodic information but, as is seen in 
depression, often stop short and instead retrieve a summary of repeated events.  
However, in the current tasks they are not forced to begin the effortful search process 
and respond at whichever level of the hierarchy naturally comes to mind. 
  The findings presented here raise important issues regarding the methods used 
to assess overgenerality of thought within depression. In particular, they reiterate the 
importance of using a wide range of assessment techniques, rather than relying on the 
commonly used word cueing paradigm. Furthermore, they further highlight that 
memory biases within depression are not necessarily mirrored in future thought; 
future work must continue to use a wider range of assessment techniques to fully 
elucidate on the conditions under which future thinking biases are, and are not, 
evident. It also needs to consider how this overgenerality of future thought may relate 
to the development and maintenance of both clinical and non-clinical levels of 
depression. Finally, whilst we have speculated on the potential mechanisms 
underlying future thinking biases, further research is required to fully establish the 
validity of these proposed mechanisms.  
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Table	  1.	  	  
Mean	  proportions	  of	  different	  response	  categories	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  
direction	  and	  mood	  group	  (SDs	  in	  parentheses)	  
	   	  
Control	  (n=31)	  
	  
Dysphoric	  (n=30)	  
	   Past	   Future	   Past	   Future	  
	  
Specific	  Events	  
	  .41	  (.11)	   	  .17	  (.11)	   	  .29	  (.19)	   	  .17	  (.10)	  
	  
Categoric	  Events	  
	  .20	  (.15)	   	  .20	  (.11)	   	  .29	  (.19)	   	  .19	  (.13)	  
	  
Extended	  Events	  
	  .29	  (.15)	   	  .43	  (.18)	   	  .35	  (.14)	   	  .37	  (.19)	  
	  
Semantic	  Associates	  
	  .12	  (.10)	   	  .21	  (.20)	   	  .12	  (.11)	   	  .28	  (.19)	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Table	  2.	  
Mean	  proportions	  of	  different	  response	  categories	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  
direction,	  sentence	  valence,	  and	  mood	  group	  (SDs	  in	  parentheses)	  
	   	   	  
Control	  (n=26)	  
	  
Dysphoric	  	  (n=27)	  
	   	   Past	   Future	   Past	   Future	  
	  
Specific	  
Events	  
	  
Positive	  
	  .50	  (.28)	   	  .30	  (.21)	   	  .42	  (.22)	   	  .16	  (.18)	  
Negative	   .49	  (.28)	   .35	  (.28)	   .34	  (.24)	   .18	  (.18)	  
	  
Categoric	  
Events	  
	  
Positive	  
	  .29	  (.29)	   	  .28	  (.21)	   	  .37	  (.22)	   	  .37	  (.19)	  
Negative	   .37	  (.23)	   .44	  (.21)	   .32	  (.25)	   .49	  (.24)	  
	  
Extended	  
Events	  
	  
Positive	  
	  .11	  (.17)	   	  .30	  (.23)	   	  .18	  (.19)	   	  .28	  (.21)	  
Negative	   .10	  (.14)	   .15	  (.16)	   .14	  (.19)	   .24	  (.21)	  
	  
Semantic	  
Associates	  
	  
Positive	  
	  .03	  (.09)	   	  .03	  (.09)	   	  .03	  (.08)	   	  .02	  (.07)	  
Negative	   .01	  (.04)	   .01	  (.04)	   .04	  (.09)	   .04	  (.08)	  
	  
	  
	  	  
 
 
